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We  study the  evolution  of the  continuous-time  replicator  dynamics  when  payoffs 
are  subject  to  aggregate  shocks  that  take  the  form  of a  Wiener  process.  In  the 
absence  of “mutation,”  the  system need  not  have  an  ergodic  distribution.  With 
mutation,  the  system does have an ergodic  distribution.  In  the  limit  as the  mutation 
rate  and  the  variance  of the  shocks converge  to  zero,  this  distribution  concentrates 
on  the  risk-dominant  equilibrium.  This  result  is not,  however,  robust  to  changes in 
the  underlying  deterministic  dynamics.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  Classification 
Numbers:  C72,  C73,  C79.  Q  1992  Academic  PI~SS.  1~. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Until  recently,  studies  of evolutionary  dynamics  have  used  deterministic 
models,  and  in  particular  have  focused  on  the  adjustment  process  known 
as  the  replicator  dynamics,  in  which  the  proportion  of  the  population 
playing  a  particular  pure  strategy  grows  at  a  rate  proportional  to  the 
difference  between  that  strategy’s  current  payoff  and  the  average  payoff 
obtained  by  the  population  as a whole.  All  Nash  equilibria  are  fixed  points 
of these  dynamics,  and  all  strict  Nash  equilibria  are  asymptotically  stable 
fixed  points.’  Thus,  the  deterministic  replicator  model  does  not  help  in 
selecting  between  strict  equilibria. 
* We  thank  Dean  Foster,  Peyton  Young,  George  Mailath,  Raj  Parekh,  and  the  referee for 
helpful  comments,  Glenn  Ellison  for  able  research  assistance,  and  the  National  Science 
Foundation  (Grant  SES-9008770)  for  financial  support. 
’ A  strategy  profile  is  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium  if each  player’s  strategy  is  a  strict  best 
response  to  the  strategies  of his  opponents,  i.e., all  other  strategies  yield  strictly lower  payoffs. 
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Of  course,  results  derived  in  deterministic  models  leave  open  the  ques- 
tion  of  whether  different  conclusions  obtain  once  stochastic  influences 
are  taken  into  account.  This  paper  modifies  the  usual  continuous-time 
replicator  model  by  supposing  that  the  payoff  functions  are  subject  to 
population-level  or  aggregate  shocks  that  we  model  using  Wiener 
processes.  We  exploit  this  specific  stochastic  system  to  make  a  number  of 
points  that  we feel  apply  to  the  study  of  stochastic  evolutionary  models 
more  generally.  First,  whether  a  stochastic  evolutionary  model  has  an 
ergodic  distribution  depends  on  apparently  tine  details  about  which  it  is 
difficult  to  have  a very  precise  intuition.  Second,  in  order  to  identify  which 
stochastic  models  are most  reasonable,  it  is better  to  introduce  the  stochastic 
elements  at  the  level  of the  growth  rates  of individual  populations  than  to 
introduce  them  directly  at  the  level  of  the  dynamics  of population  shares. 
Introducing  the  stochastic  shocks  at  the  more  primitive  level  of  the 
individual  populations  has  the  advantage  of focusing  attention  on  how the 
stochastic  shocks  are  meant  to  be  interpreted.  In  a  model  with  a  large 
population,  such  shocks  are  more  naturally  thought  of as due  to  aggregate 
effects  like  the  “weather”  than  as  the  results  of  individual-specific  effects 
that  might  be  expected  to  average  out  across  the  population.  Another 
benefit  of introducing  the  stochastic  shocks  at  the  level  of the  populations 
is  that  the  implications  of these  shocks  for  the  behavior  of the  population 
shares  can  be  different  than  what  intuition  might  suggest. 
Our  paper  follows  previous  work  by  Foster  and  Young  [4]  and 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  [g],  which  suggests  that  it  may  be  possible  to 
discriminate  between  strict  Nash  equilibria  by  considering  evolutionary 
models  with  stochastic  shocks.  More  precisely,  both  papers  consider 
stochastic  models  that  have  ergodic  distributions-asymptotic  distributions 
over  strategies  that  are  independent  of  the  initial  position  of  the 
system-and  consider  the  limits  of the  ergodic  distributions  over  strategies 
as the  variance  of the  noise  term  converges  to  0. The  papers  then  identify 
a class of 2 x 2 games  in  which  the  limit  distribution  is concentrated  at  one 
of the  game’s  two  strict  Nash  equilibria,  namely  the  equilibrium  which  is 
“risk  dominant”  in  the  sense of Harsanyi  and  Selten  [6]. 
Our  paper  is  closer  to  Foster  and  Young,  who  were,  as  far  as  we 
know,  the  first  to  consider  a  stochastic-differential-equation  model  of 
evolutionary  dynamics.  Our  paper  differs  from  theirs  in  the  following  ways. 
First,  Foster  and  Young  add  the  stochastic  shocks  directly  to  the 
deterministic  replicator  dynamics  for  population  shares.  As  we  will  see, 
once  stochastic  effects  are  taken  into  account,  it  is  not  clear  that  the 
deterministic  part  of  the  evolution  of  the  aggregate  state  should  be  the 
same  as  if  stochastic  effects are  absent.  Second,  while  Foster  and  Young 
only  determine  the  limit  of the  ergodic  distribution  for  the  case where  the 
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our  analysis  suggests  that  the  most  neutral  assumption  is that  the  variance 
depends  on  the  population  shares  in  a  particular  way.  That  is,  if  the 
variance  is  constant  at  the  level  of  the  growth  rates  of  the  individual 
populations,  it  will  not  be  constant  in  the  derived  system  for  population 
shares. Third,  Foster  and  Young  suppose  that  the  boundary  of the  strategy 
simplex  is  reflecting,  which  they  justify  as  an  approximation  of the  effects 
of immigration  and  mutation.  (As we explain  in  the  concluding  section,  we 
do  not  believe  that  their  model  can  be interpreted  in  this  way.)  Fourth,  our 
basic  model  does  not  always  have  an  ergodic  distribution,  and  the 
asymptotic  behavior  of the  system  can  depend  on  its  initial  conditions.  In 
particular,  it  is  not  possible  to  choose  between  two  strict  equilibria  by 
letting  the  variance  of the  noise  term  go  to  zero,  since  the  limiting  distribu- 
tion  depends  on  the  initial  condition.  (There  is  an  ergodic  distribution, 
however,  when  mutations  are  included  in  the  model,  and  it  converges  to 
the  risk-dominant  equilibrium  as the  mutation  rates and  the  variance  of the 
noise  term  go  to  zero.) 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  differ  in  considering  a  discrete-time  system 
with  a  finite  population  size,  where  each  individual  “mutates”  from  one 
strategy  to  the  other  strategy  with  a  fixed  probability.  Not  only  does  this 
model  have  an  ergodic  distribution,  but  the  limit  of this  distribution  as the 
probability  of mutations  shrinks  is concentrated  at  the  risk-dominant  equi- 
librium  for  any  deterministic  dynamics  that  is a sign-preserving  transforma- 
tion  of the  replicator  dynamics,  i.e.,  so long  as the  population  share  playing 
a strategy  tends  to  grow when  that  strategy  does  better  than  the  population 
average.  This  striking  conclusion  is due  to  the  fact  that  Kandori,  Mailath, 
and  Rob  consider  a  system  which  can  make  discrete  jumps:  When  the 
probability  of mutation  is  low,  the  system  spends  most  of  its  time  at  the 
two  strict  equilibria,  with  shifts  from  one  equilibrium  to  the  other 
occurring  when  enough  individuals  mutate  simultaneously  to  shift  the  state 
of the  system  to  the  region  where  the  other  strategy  is a best  response.  The 
limit  of the  ergodic  distribution  is  determined  by  the  relative  probabilities 
of the  shifts  from  one  equilibrium  to  the  other,  which  depends  only  on  the 
relative  sizes of the  equilibria’s  basins  of attraction,  and  not  on  the  speed 
of adjustment  in  each  basin.  In  contrast,  the  limit  of the  ergodic  distribu- 
tion  in  our  model  (when  one  exists)  does  depend  on  the  exact  form  of the 
deterministic  dynamics.  Intuitively,  the  likelihood  that  a  Wiener  process 
will  be  able  to  “swim  upstream”  k  meters  against  a  deterministic  flow 
depends  both  on  the  distance  k  and  on  the  strength  of the  flow,  while  the 
probability  that  a  discrete-time  system  jumps  k  or  more  meters  “over  the 
flow”  in  a  single  period  depends  on  k  but  not  on  the  strength  of the  flow. 
This  explains  the  differences  in  the  generality  of  the  models’  conclusions, 
and  suggests  that  long-run  behavior  may  depend  on  the  precise  form  of the 
deterministic  dynamics  in  any  model  with  continuous  sample  paths. EVOLUTIONARY  DYNAMICS  423 
II.  THE  MODEL 
This  section  develops  a  stochastic  version  of  the  continuous-time 
replicator  dynamics  that  we  call  our  “preferred  model.”  We  begin  by 
reviewing  the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics.  Consider  a symmetric  two- 
player  game  with  n  pure  strategies  sl,  .  .  .  . s,  and  payoff  function  u( .,.).  We 
suppose  that  there  are  n  different  populations  or  phenotypes  of  players, 
with  every  member  of the  ith  population  genetically  coded  to  play  si.  Each 
population  contains  a  continuum  of  infinitesimal  individuals.  The  size  of 
the  ith  population  is rir  r  =  (rl,  .  .  .  . r,)  is the  vector  of population  sizes, and 
the  total  size of the  population  is  R=Ciri. 
The  model  evolves  over  time  as  follows.  Individuals  are  repeatedly 
matched  with  a  randomly  chosen  opponent  to  play  the  stage  game.  Let 
ui(r)  =  cj  U(Si, s,) rj/R  denote  the  expected  payoff  of an  individual  of type 
i  when  matched  against  a  randomly  chosen  member  of  the  population. 
Then  we assume  that 
dr,(t)/df  =  r,(t).  u,(r(t)),  (1) 
where  r(t)  is  the  vector  of  population  sizes  at  time  f.  If  we  then  define 
di=  ri/R  to  be  the  proportion  of  type-i  individuals,  and  note  that  u;  is 
homogeneous  of degree  0,  we can  compute: 
Lh;(t)/dt=d,(t)~ 
[ 
u;(~(t))-C~j(t)Uj(3(f))  .  1 
(2) 
j 
Equation  (2)  is  the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics. 
For  future  reference,  we note  that  in  the  case of only  two  strategies,  (2) 
simplifies  to 
d~t(t)ld~  = a,(t) 4f)CU,(4f))  -  %(4f))l.  (3) 
Before  introducing  the  aggregate  shocks,  it  may  be  helpful  to  review  a 
few key  features  of the  deterministic  model.  The  standard  interpretation  of 
(1)  is  that  individuals  reproduce  asexually,  and  that  the  number  of their 
offspring  is determined  by  their  payoff  in  the  game.  Under  this  interpreta- 
tion,  (1)  describes  the  net  growth  rate  of the  populations,  i.e.,  the  difference 
between  the  birth  and  death  rates,  so negative  growth  rates  correspond  to 
situations  in  which  deaths  outnumber  births.  Of course,  actual  populations 
are  finite;  (1)  is  intended  to  describe  the  limit  behavior  of  a  discrete- 
population  process  in  which  players  from  the  various  population  are 
randomly  matched  to  play  the  game.  Intuitively,  the  randomness  created 
by  the  random-matching  process  will  “average  out”  by  a  law  of  large 
numbers,  so  that  the  continuum-of-players  limit  will  be deterministic.  2 The 
*  Boylan  [3]  provides  conditions  under  which  the  solution  to  (1)  approximates  the  limit 
behavior  of  a  finite-population,  discrete-time,  random-matching  evolutionary  model,  where 
the  time  period  shrinks  to  zero  as  the  number  of  players  tends  to  infinity. 424  FUDENBERG  AND  HARRIS 
same  large-numbers  intuition  suggests  that  any  stochastic  effects  that 
are  i.i.d.  across  individuals  will  average  out  as  well.  In  particular,  i.i.d. 
“mutations”  would  not  lead  to  a stochastic  continuum-of-players  limit,  and 
any  stochastic  effects that  persist  in  the  limit  must  stem  from  shocks  that 
are  correlated  across  individuals. 
Note  finally  that  for  any j  the  boundary  point  9, =  1 is a  steady  state  of 
(2)  for  any  specification  of the  payoff  functions.  3 (This  is because  a popula- 
tion  with  zero  members  cannot  grow  by  reproduction.)  These  boundary 
points  will  be  steady  states  in  our  stochastic  model  as well,  which  is  one 
way  of explaining  why  we will  not  encounter  difficulties  in  describing  the 
behavior  of the  system  near  the  boundary. 
Now  suppose  that  we  wish  to  introduce  the  possibility  of  stochastic 
shocks.  One  way  to  do  this  is  to  add  a  stochastic  disturbance  directly  to 
(2),  which  is  the  method  used  by  Foster  and  Young.  In  our  opinion,  such 
an  approach  has  two  drawbacks.  The  first  one  is primarily  technical:  If,  as 
in  Foster  and  Young,  one  adds  a Wiener  process  with  constant  variance  to 
Eq.  (2),  the  resulting  solutions  can  have  negative  population  shares,  so that 
some  additional  changes  are  required  for  the  model  to  be well  defined;  our 
method  avoids  these  complications.  Second,  under  the  biological  inter- 
pretation  of the  replicator  dynamics,  it  is  (1)  that  is  fundamental,  so  that 
it  is  easier  to  interpret  and  evaluate  changes  to  it  than  changes  to  the 
derived  (2). 
For  these  reasons,  we  prefer  to  add  the  disturbance  to  (l),  and  then 
derive  the  analog  of  (2).  Let  W  be  an  n-dimensional  Wiener  process  with 
unit  variance  and  0 covariance.  Then  suppose  that  r  is an  Ito  process,  with 
dr,(t)=ri(t).[ui(r(t))dt+a,dWi(t)].  (1’) 
Note  that  the  term  o,dW,  is  added  to  the  expected  payoff  ui(r)  of  an 
individual  of type  i  and  is  not  added  directly  to  dri.  For  this  reason,  the 
population  size ri  will  remain  positive  for  any  realization  of  Wi.  The  inter- 
pretation  of  (1’)  is  that  the  payoff  to  playing  strategy  i  is  subject  to  an 
aggregate  shock,  say due  to  the  “weather.”  The  equation  incorporates  the 
restrictions  that  the  shock  on  each  strategy  i is  independent  of which  other 
strategy  it  is  matched  with,  and  that  the  shocks  on  different  strategies  are 
independent.  4 
3 Strategies  that  are  not  Nash  equilibria  are  unstable  steady  states. 
4To  emphasize  this  point,  consider  for  the  moment  a  more  general  model  in  which  the 
payoff  to  playing  strategy  i  against  strategy  j  is  u(s,,  s,)  + dV,(r)/dr, where  dV(t)/dt is a matrix 
of  possibly  correlated  payoff  shocks.  The  model  of  this  section  is  then  the  special  case  in  which 
dV,(t)/dr  =  dV,(r)/dr  for  all  i, j  and  k,  and  dVo(r)/dr  and  dV,,(r)/dr  are  independent  for  all 
i#  k.  We  believe  that  main  points  would  still  emerge  without  these  restrictions,  but  we  have 
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Now  we want  to  use  (1’)  to  compute  the  analog  of  (2).  To  do  this,  we 
write  a;(t)  =fj(r(t))  =  r,(t)/R(t),  and  apply  Ito’s  lemma  to  obtain 
ddi=c  [8f,(r)/ar,]  dr,+iC  [a%(r)/&,&-,]  drjdr,,  (2’) 
i  1.k 
where  dr, drk =  rj a;  dt  if j  =  k,  and  0  otherwise. 
When  there  are  only  two  pure  strategies,  substituting  in  for  the  partial 
derivatives  of L  in  (3 ) and  simplifying  yields 
d5, =  il, +[(u1(.3)-  uz(d)) dt + ( a:ci,-a:a,)dt+a,dW,-o,dW,] 
=31”12[(~l(d)-~Z(~))df+(~:32-~:~,)dr+~d~)],  (3’) 
where  u =  jqz,  and  m=  ( W, -  W,)/a  is a  standard  Wiener  process. 
Let  us  discuss  this  equation  before  proceeding.  The  first  term  inside  the 
square  brackets,  (u,(d)  -  u*(g))  dt,  says  that  til  tends  to  increase  when 
strategy  1 does  better  than  strategy  2;  this  term  is familiar  from  the  deter- 
ministic  dynamics.  The  deterministic  term  (o:o,  -  6:~~)  dt is not  present  in 
Eq.  (2),  and  does  not  arise  if  the  stochastic  shocks  are  added  directly  to 
that  equation.  This  term,  which  says  roughly  that  if  ti,  gets  large  the 
stochastic  shocks  in  the  system  will  tend  to  make  it  smaller,  arises  for  the 
following  reason:  For  fixed  r2,  the  function  g,(r,)  =  rl/(rl  +  r2),  which 
maps  [0,  00)  to  [0,  11, is  concave  for  r,  >  r2,  so by  Jensen’s  inequality  the 
expected  value  of g,(r,  ) is  less than  g,  applied  to  the  expected  value  of rl  . 
Likewise,  g,  is  convex  for  r,  =c  rz. 
The  third  term  in  square  brackets  represents  the  direct  effect  of  the 
current  shock.  Finally,  note  that,  as  in  (3),  each  term  inside  the  square 
brackets  in  (3’),  including  the  stochastic  term  (T d@,  is  multiplied  by  a,+. 
Thus,  the  boundary  points  are  steady  states  of the  stochastic  process,  and, 
if the  process  begins  with  positive  shares for  each  strategy,  the  boundaries 
will  never  be  reached  in  finite  time. 
III.  ASYMPTOTIC  BEHAVIOR 
This  section  analyzes  the  asymptotic  behavior  of the  system  represented 
by  (2’),  with  particular  emphasis  on  when  the  model  has  an  ergodic  dis- 
tribution,  and  when  instead  the  system  is eventually  absorbed  at  a steady 
state. 
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Suppose  that  the  payoff  matrix  is as in  Fig.  1. We  distinguish  three  cases: 
(i)  The  case of a  strictly  dominant  strategy.  If  a >  c and  b >  d then 
strategy  1 strictly  dominates  strategy  2.  Similarly,  if  a <  c  and  b <  d  then 
strategy  2  strictly  dominates  strategy  1. 
(ii)  The  coordination  case.  If  a >  c  and  b <  d  then  the  game  has 
three  Nash  equilibria:  two  pure-strategy  equilibria  at  4, =  1 and  d, =  0, and 
a mixed-strategy  equilibrium  at  3:  =  (d -  b)/(  (d -  b)  +  (a -  c)). 
(iii)  The  case of a mixed-strategy  equilibrium.  If  a <  c and  b >  d then 
the  unique  symmetric  equilibrium  is  a  mixed-strategy  equilibrium  at 
4:  =  (d -  b)/(  (d -  b)  +  (a -  c)).  (There  are  also  two  asymmetric  pure- 
strategy  equilibria,  but  these  are  not  relevant  in  our  setting.) 
Aside  from  borderline  cases, these  cases are  exhaustive. 
Our  main  finding  for  these  cases are  as follows.  In  the  case of a  strictly 
dominant  strategy,  the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics  converge  to  this 
strategy.  This  is  true  of the  stochastic  dynamics  (3’)  as well,  provided  that 
the  variances  u:  and  0:  of  the  shocks  are  sufficiently  small.  The  basic 
reason  for  this  is  that  when  0:  and  0:  are  small,  the  contribution  that  5: 
and  C$ make  to  the  deterministic  part  of the  dynamics  is  swamped  by  the 
contribution  made  by  the  payoffs,  resulting  in  an  unambiguous  flow in  the 
direction  of  the  strictly  dominant  strategy.  Since  the  variance  of  the 
stochastic  part  of  the  dynamics  tends  to  zero  as  the  strictly  dominant 
strategy  is  approached,  the  stochastic  dynamics  converge  to  this  strategy. 
(Because  the  deterministic  part  of  the  dynamics  also  tends  to  zero  as the 
strictly  dominant  strategy  is  approached,  the  exact  argument  is  somewhat 
more  complex.  The  result  depends,  roughly  speaking,  on  the  ratio  of  the 
deterministic  and  stochastic  parts.) 
In  the  coordination  case, the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics  converge 
to  til  =  1  if  the  initial  state  a,(O)>  a:,  and  to  d, =  0  if  the  initial  state 
41(0)<61*.  If  g,(O)=,lf,  then  the  system  remains  at  the  unstable  steady 
state  a:.  The  stochastic  dynamics  are  similar:  Provided  that  UT and  C:  are 
suff%iently  small,  the  solution  to  (2’)  converges  to  one  of the  pure-strategy 
equilibria  with  probability  one.  The  main  difference  with  the  deterministic 
dynamics  is  that  each  of  the  pure-strategy  equilibria  is  reached  with 
positive  probability.  This  difference  disappears,  however,  as VT and  C:  go 
to  zero.  For  example,  if d,(O)  >  4:  then  the  probability  that  our  stochastic 
dynamics  converge  to  til  =  1 goes to  1 as 0:  and  C:  go  to  zero. 
The  intuition  for  this  case builds  on  that  for  the  case of a strictly  domi- 
nant  strategy.  In  that  case there  is  a  single  strict  equilibrium  that  acts  as 
a  stable  attractor  for  the  stochastic  dynamics.  In  the  coordination  case 
there  are  two  strict  equilibria,  each  of  which  acts  as  a  stable  attractor. 
Either  attractor  may  “capture”  the  system;  which  one  does  will  depend  on EVOLUTIONARY  DYNAMICS  421 
the  stochastic  shocks.  Finally,  as r~r and  gZ go  to  zero,  the  shocks  become 
relatively  unimportant  in  determining  which  attractor  captures  the  system. 
Our  conclusions  here  are  in  contrast  to  those  of Foster  and  Young,  and 
Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob,  who  both  obtain  an  ergodic  distribution  in  this 
case. 5,6 
In  the  case of a  mixed-strategy  equilibrium,  the  deterministic  replicator 
dynamics  converges  to  4:  from  all  starting  points.  Our  stochastic  dynamics 
possess an  ergodic  distribution,  to  which  the  system  settles  down  from  all 
starting  points.  Moreover  the  ergodic  distribution  collapses  to  a point  mass 
at  ~1: as 0,  and  o2 +  0.  Our  dynamics  possess an  ergodic  distribution  for 
two  reasons.  First,  at  the  boundaries  5, =  1 and  bl  =  0  the  contribution  of 
the  payoffs  to  the  deterministic  part  of the  dynamics  and  the  contribution 
of  C:  and  0:  both  point  towards  the  interior  of  [0,  11.  Hence  the  system 
cannot  get  stuck  at  a  boundary.  Second,  the  stochastic  part  of  the 
dynamics  has  positive  variance  at  all  interior  points,  so the  system  cannot 
get  stuck  at  an  interior  point  either. 
In  order  to  establish  these  claims,  we shall  exploit  results  of Gihman  and 
Skorohod  [S]  and  Skorohod  [9].  In  order  to  state  these  results,  let 
do1 =  a(d,)  dt +  fl(bi)  dm  be  a stochastic  differential  equation  on  the  inter- 
val  (0,  l),  and  let  d,(O)  be its  initial  position.  Fix  an  arbitrary  z E (0,  l),  and 
introduce  the  quantities 
P(YM*(~)~  & 1 
dx, 
12=J+’  exp[  -SX  CWYYB*(Y)~ &  dx> 
91(O)  i  1 
and  the  function 
2 
W-4  =m  w  CWYM*(Y)I  dy  .’  1 
According  to  Theorem  16.1 of Gihman  and  Skorohod  [ 5, p.  1191,  the  main 
features  of the  asymptotic  behavior  of the  system  can  be deduced  from  the 
’ Foster  and  Young  compute  the  ergodic  distribution  only  for  the  case b  =  c. 
6 Both  Foster  and  Young,  and  Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob,  consider  only  the  coordination 
case. 
’ Note  that  replacing  z  by z’ in  the  formulae  for  I,,  I,,  and  M  has the  effect of multiplying 
the  exponential  term  by a constant  which  is independent  of x. The  arguments  below  depend 
on  whether  I,  and  I,  are  finite,  on  their  ratio,  and  on  the  relative  size  of M  at  various  X, and 
all  of these properties  are  invariant  when  z  is changed. 428  FUDENBERG  AND  HARRIS 
properties  of I,  and  I,.  *  Specifically,  if  I,  is  infinite  and  I,  is  finite,  then 
the  system  converges  to  1  almost  surely:  if  I,  is  finite  and  Z2 is  infinite, 
then  the  system  converges  to  0  almost  surely;  if II  and  Z2 are  both  finite, 
then  the  system  converges  to  1 with  probability  Zr/(Z,  +  f2)  and  to  0  with 
probability  ZJ(Z,  +  I,);  and  if  I,  and  Zz are  both  infinite,  then  the  system 
oscillates  forever,  with 
Prob{lim  inf til(f)  =Oj  =  Prob{lim  sup tlr(t)  =  1)  =  1 
r-m  ,--rZC 
Also,  according  to  Theorem  1.17  of  Skorohod  [9,  p. 481,  the  description 
of the  asymptotic  behavior  of the  system  can  be  refined  in  the  case where 
I,  and  I,  are  both  infinite  by  using  the  properties  of M.9  Specifically,  if I, 
and  Z,  are  both  infinite  and  Sh M(x)  dx  is  finite,  then  the  system  has 
a  unique  ergodic  distribution  with  density  M(x)/jA  M(w)  dw,  and  the 
distribution  of err(t)  converges  to  this  ergodic  distribution  as t +  cc. 
We  can  now establish 
PROPOSITION  1.  (i)  rf  a-c>(of-(r:)/2  and  d-b<(ai-a:)/2  then 
ti,( t) +  1 as t +  00 with  probability  1. 
(ii)  Zf a-~<(a:-a:)/2  and  d-b>(c:-r$)/2  then  Cjl(t)-+O  as 
t -+  CC with  probability  1. 
(iii)  Zf u-c>(c7:--af)/2  and  d-b>(ai-a:)/2  then  J1(t)+  1  as 
t +  cc  with probability  I,  J(Z, +  Z2) and  d,(t)  +  0  as t -+  co  with  complemen- 
tary  probability. 
*The  theorem  quoted  is  actually  developed  for  processes on  the  whole  real  line,  whereas 
our  process is confined  to  the  unit  interval.  That  a parallel  theorem  applies  to  our  process can 
be  seen  in  at  least  two  ways.  First  it  can  be  checked  that  Theorem  15.4  of Gihman  and 
Skorohod  [S,  p. 1101  applies  to  the  unit  interval,  and  that  the  proof  of Theorem  16.1  there- 
fore  extends  as well.  Secondly,  one  can  consider  the  process  3’, given  by the  formula  2, = 
ln(j,/(  1 -  9,)).  By Ito’s  lemma,  the  process ?,  satisfies the  stochastic  differential  equation 
But  Theorem  16.1  of  Gihman  and  Skorohod  applies  to  2,  in  the  case  in  which  we  are 
interested,  namely  Eq. (2’):  a(dr)  and  b(dl)  both  include  the  factor  dr(l  -3r),  and  so  the 
standing  regularity  conditions  of Gihman  and  Skorohod,  namely  linear  boundedness  and 
Lipschitz  continuity,  are  satisfied.  Hence  the  relevant  features  of the  asymptotic  behavior  of 
3, can  be determined  by reference  to  integrals  7, and  7,.  Finally,  it  turns  out  that  there  is a 
scalar  k  > 0 such  that  I,  =  kf,  and  I,  =  kr2.  (This  can  be  verified  by changing  the  variables  of 
integration  in  7,  and  71 twice  in  the  natural  way.) 
’ Once  again,  the  theorem  quoted  is actually  developed  for  processes on  the  whole  real  line. 
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(iv)  rfa-~<(a:-a:)/2  and  d-b<(of-a:)/2  then 
Prob{liminf~,(t)=O}  =Prob{limsup~,(t)=  l>  =  1. 
t-m  I +  rx  ,x7 
Moreover,  the  system  possesses a  unique  ergodie  distribution,  to  which  the 
distribution  of  gl(t)  converges  as t -+  CO. 
Part  (i)  of  the  proposition  shows  that,  if  strategy  1 is  strictly  dominant 
and  if  c1  and  cz  are  sufficiently  small,  then  our  stochastic  dynamics  con- 
verge  with  probability  one  to  strategy  1. Part  (ii)  establishes  the  analogous 
result  for  the  case  when  strategy  2  is  strictly  dominant.  Part  (iii)  shows 
that,  if the  coordination  case obtains  and  if CT,  and  c2 are  sufficiently  small, 
then  our  stochastic  dynamics  converge  with  probability  one  to  one  of the 
two  strict  equilibria,  and  that  each  equilibrium  is  reached  with  positive 
probability.  Part  (iv)  shows  that,  in  the  case  of  a  mixed-strategy  equi- 
librium  our  stochastic  dynamics  possesses an  ergodic  distribution. 
More  generally,  the  proposition  shows how the  qualitative  features  of the 
asymptotics  of our  stochastic  system,  such  as the  existence  or  non-existence 
of an  ergodic  distribution,  depend  in  relatively  subtle  ways  on  the  inter- 
action  between  the  payoffs  of  the  game  and  the  size  of the  shocks  to  the 
system.  It  also  shows  that  such  qualitative  features  may  be  sensitive  to  the 
choice  of stochastic  system.  For  example,  the  systems  of Foster  and  Young, 
and  Kandori,  Mailath  and  Rob  both  possess ergodic  distributions  irrespec- 
tive  of the  exact  configuration  of payoffs. 
Proof:  Substituting  the  payoff  matrix  into  (3’)  and  eliminating 
g2=  l-3,  yields 
a(aI)=ti,(l  -ti,)[a:(l  -r1~)--~~f3~+ti,(a-c)+(1-3,)(b-d)], 
and 
P(~1)=31(1-~*)~. 
Substituting  these  values  of a and  /I  into  the  definitions  of I,  and  Z2 yields 
1,  =  j"'"'  exp  [  -  j-'  2[a:(l-y)-a:y+(a-c)y 
0  T 
-  Cd-b)(l  -  ~)llC~~y(l-  y)l  dy 1 
dx 
z2=[>:,o,exP[  4:  2[41  -y)-f++(a-c)y 
-  (d-  b)( 1 -  y)llCa2y(  1 -  y)]  dyl  dx. 430  FTJDENBERG  AND  HARRIS 
To  evaluate  these  integrals,  note  that  the  inner  integral  can  be  integrated 
exactly  to  obtain 
-2(a-c-fJ:)ln  l-x  -  - 
CT2  (  1  1-Z 
2(d-b-fJ;)In  5 
a2  (  >.  z  (4) 
Hence 
zI  =I”(“’  (x/z)2C~-~--o:1/~Z[(1  vx)/(l  ~z)]2~~-~-d1/~zdx~  (5) 
0 
But  (5)  is  finite  if  and  only  if  2[d-  b -  u:]/o’  >  -  1,  i.e.,  if  and  only  if 
d-b>  (a:-crf)/2.  Similarly,  (6)  is  finite  if and  only  if  a-c>  (a:  -0:)/2. 
This  establishes  parts  (i),  (ii),  and  (iii),  and  the  first  part  of (iv).  (Note  that 
we only  need  a -  c <  (0:  -  0:)/2  and  d-  b <  (a:  -  a:)/2  for  the  first  part  of 
(iv).) 
Proceeding  as for  I,  and  Z,,  one  obtains 
2[-+d+b]/oz 
So  j;  M(x)  dx  <  00  if  and  only  if  2[-a:-d+b]/a2>  -1  and 
2[-as-a+c]/a2>  -1,  i.e.,  if  and  only  if  d-b<(ai-a:)/2  and 
a -  c <  (0:  -  0:)/2.  This  establishes  the  second  part  of  (iv).  1 
Proposition  1  has  established  the  basic  asymptotics  of  our  stochastic 
dynamics.  However,  in  the  coordination  case it  tells  us only  that  the  system 
converges  to  one  of the  two  strict  equilibria  with  a probability  depending 
on  the  initial  condition,  and  in  the  mixed-strategy  case it  tells  us only  that 
the  system  possesses an  ergodic  distribution.  Proposition  2  which  follows 
examines  the  behavior  of the  probability  with  which  a given  equilibrium  is 
reached  in  the  coordination  case, and  the  behavior  of the  ergodic  distribu- 
tion  in  the  mixed-strategy  case, as (TV  and  o2  go  to  zero. 
PROPOSITION  2.  Suppose  that  a >  c  and  b <  d  (the  coordination  case). 
Then 
(i)  Zf  dl(0)  >  (d-  b)/[d-  b +  a -  c],  the probability  that  the  system 
converges  to  strategy  1 converges  to  1 us (a,,  az) -+  (0,O). 
(ii)  Zf LJ~(O) <  (d-  b)/[d-  b +  u-c],  the  probability  that  the  system 
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Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  that  a -C c and  b >  d  (the  mixed-strategy  case)  . 
Then : 
(iii)  The  ergodic  distribution  converges  to  the  degenerate  distribution 
that  assigns  unit  mass  to  the  unique  mixed  strategy  equilibrium. 
These  conclusions  show that,  as 6,  and  a2  become  small,  the  behavior 
of  the  stochastic  system  comes  to  resemble  that  of  the  deterministic 
replicator  dynamics  more  and  more  closely. 
Proof:  We  begin  with  cases (i)  and  (ii).  Note  first  that  the  integrands 
in  (5)  and  (6)  for  I,  and  Z2 are  the  same,  and  are  proportional  to 
f(x;  aI,  a2) =  [xdpbeof(  1 -  x)“-c-o:]2/u2  =  g(x;  al,  a2)2/u2, 
say.  Second,  because  a >  c and  b cd,  I,  and  I2  are  both  finite  for  a,,  a2 
sufficiently  small.  (Cf.  the  proof  of  Proposition  (iii)).  It  follows  that 
f(  .; ai,  az)  can  be  thought  of  as  the  unnormalized  density  of  a  random 
variable  on  [0,  11.  The  ratios  Z,/(Z,  +  Z,)  and  Z,/(Z,  +  Z2)  are  then  the 
probability  that  this  random  variable  lies  in  the  intervals  [0,  cli(O)]  and 
[di(O),  l]  respectively.  Hence,  to  establish  parts  (i)  and  (ii),  it  will  suffice 
to  show that  the  distribution  of this  random  variable  converges  to  a  unit 
mass  at  tif=(d-b)/(d-b+a-c).  For  this  implies  that  if rii(O)<J:  then 
the  probability  that  the  random  variable  lies  in  [0,  (I,(O)]  converges  to 
zero,  and  if dr(O) >  d?  then  the  probability  that  the  random  variable  lies  in 
[0,  d,(O)]  converges  to  one. 
To  this  end,  fix  E >  0.  Since  g(  . ; 0,O)  has  a  unique  maximum  at 
ilf,  (  =  g(df;  0,  0)  -  max{g(a:  -  2s; 0,  0),  g(ilf  +  2s; 0, 0)}  >  0.  Since 
g(.;a,,a,)+g(.;O,O)  uniformly  as  a1,a2-+0,  we  may  find  6>0 
such  that:  6<s;  g(x;a,,a,)ag(cl:;O,O)-l/3  for  all  x~[n:-8,3T+h] 
and  all  \(a,,  a2)j  ~6;  and  g(x;  a,,  a2) <  g(d I* ; 0,O)  -  2[/3  for  all 
x~[O,rli’-22~]u[a:+2~,  11. It  follows  that 
min  xE~J;--6.J;+6,f(x;a1,a2) 
rnax,e  [O,  +-Z&l”  [J;  +2E.Ijf(x;al,a2)  ’ 
for  all  ](a,,  a2)]  <  6.  Since  the  right-hand  side  of this  inequality  tends  to 
infinity  as  a,,  a2 +  0,  we  conclude  that  all  the  mass  of  the  distribution 
corresponding  tof(x;  a,,  a2) concentrates  in  the  interval  [d:  -  2s, 5:  +  2~1 
as  ai,  a2 +  0.  Since  E was  arbitrary,  this  completes  the  demonstration  of 
parts  (i)  and  (ii). 
A  similar  argument  applied  to  the  unnormalized  density  M  establishes 
part  (iii).  1 
Note  that  Proposition  2  and  the  discussion  immediately  preceding  it 
shows  that  the  limiting  behavior  as the  variance  shrinks  does  not  depend 
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IV.  DETERMINISTIC  “MUTATION”  RATES 
We  call  the  system  represented  by  (2’)  our  “preferred”  model  because  it 
adds  aggregate  stochastic  shocks  to  the  replicator  dynamics  in  a  way  that 
we find  natural.  However,  stochastic  shocks  are  far  from  the  only  change 
to  the  replicator  dynamics  that  one  might  want  to  consider.  This  section 
further  alters  the  replicator  dynamics  to  capture  the  possibility  of mutation. 
We  think  of mutations  as being  independent  between  the  many  individuals 
in  the  population.  This  being  the  case,  mutation  is  best  modelled  as  a 
deterministic  flow between  strategies,  as in  Boylan  [ 11. 
More  precisely,  suppose  that  each  individual  of phenotype  i  has  a finite 
flow probability  of mutating  into  each  phenotype  j#  i. Then,  because  there 
is  an  infinite  number  of  individuals  of phenotype  i,  there  will  be  for  each 
j#  i a  deterministic  flow  from  phenotype  i  into  phenotype  j  equal  to  the 
flow  probability  for  mutations  of  i  into  j  times  the  total  number  of 
individuals  in  phenotype  i.  In  the  case of two  phenotypes,  if Ai is the  flow 
probability  that  an  individual  of phenotype  i  mutates  into  an  individual  of 
phenotype  3 -  i,  then  the  ith  population  satisfies  the  stochastic  differential 
equation 
dri=  ri(ui(r)  dt + oi dW,)  -  Airi dt + E,r, dt.  (7) 
Note  that  this  specification  is  appropriate  for  reproduction-independent 
mutations.  lo With  reproduction-dependent  mutations  it  would  be  better  to 
model  mutation  by  a  deterministic  flow from  phenotype  i  to  phenotype  j 
proportional  to  the  gross rate  of  reproduction  of  phenotype  i. I1 Such  a 
model  would  be interesting,  but  complex,  as it  would  require  that  separate 
processes  be  introduced  to  model  births  and  deaths,  both  of which  would 
have  to  be  positive-valued.  (Note  that  the  above  does  nor  suggest  that  the 
mutation  rate  should  apply  to  the  net growth  rate  dr,/dt.) 
Returning  to  the  system  (7)  we define  4, =  rl/(r,  +  rz)  to  be  the  popula- 
tion  fraction  playing  strategy  1, and  use Ito’s  lemma  to  compute 
+  s1g2cs,  dW,  -  3, 32c2 dW, 
lo Reproduction-independent  mutations  include  those  caused  by  mutagen  damage 
(including  chemical  and  spectral  mutagens)  and  those  caused  by mobile  genetic  elements 
(including  those  associated  with  plasmids,  transposons,  viruses, and  phages). 
”  Reproduction-independent  mutations  occur  because  replication  of DNA  is error-prone. EVOLUTIONARY  DYNAMICS  433 
=  ~(6~) dt+  fi(dI)  dm, 
say,  where  dm  is  a standard  Wiener  process. 
(8) 
Inspection  of (8)  shows  that  the  mutation  terms  A,  and  1,  enter  in  two 
ways,  once  scaled  by  a, g2 along  with  the  payoffs,  and  once  not  so  scaled, 
so  that,  e.g.,  the  term  &cii  does  not  vanish  at  the  boundary  3, =  1,  but 
rather  points  inwards.  Thus  the  population  will  never  converge  to  the 
boundaries.  The  deterministic  part  of the  system  may  vanish  in  the  interior 
of  the  interval,  but  here  the  variance  is  bounded  away  from  zero.  So  we 
would  not  expect  the  population  to  converge  to  an  interior  point  either, 
and  hence  we expect  that  (8)  will  have  an  ergodic  distribution  for  any 
specification  of the  stage-game  payoffs.  Proposition  3 shows that  this  is the 
case. 
PROPOSITION  3.  The process  corresponding to (8) has  an ergodic distribu- 
tion for  all c,,  (T?  > 0  and all A,,  1, > 0. Moreover  the distribution  of  b,(t) 
converges  to  this ergodic distribution  as t -+ co. 
Proof:  As above,  we need  to  show that  I,  and  I2  are  both  infinite,  and 
that  JAM(x)  dx  is  finite.  To  this  end,  note  that 
4Y)/B2(Y)  =  Ml  -  Y)Coi(l  -  y)  -  o:y  + (a -  c) y 
-  (d-  b)(l  -  Y) +  12  -  &I+  A,(1  -  Y)~  -  2,  y2]/[o;y2(l  -  y)21. 
The  largest  contribution  to  a( y)/p’(  y)  in  the  neighborhood  of zero  comes 
from  the  term  A,( 1 -  y)2  in  the  numerator,  and  is of order  l/v2.  It  follows 
that  the  integral  of LY(  y)//?‘(  y) 
order  s;(O) 
is of order  -  l/x,  and  therefore  that  I,  is  of 
exp( l/x)  dx.  That  is,  I,  is infinite.  Similarly,  I,  is  infinite. 
Arguing  in  the  same  way  we  conclude  that  M(x)  is  of  order 
exp( -  l/x)/x2  in  the  neighborhood  of  0  and  of  order  exp( -  I/(  1 -x))/ 
(1 -x)*  in  the  neighborhood  of 1. So  1;  M(x)  dx  is finite.  m 
Proposition  1  characterized  the  long-run  behavior  of  the  stochastic 
dynamics  (3’).  Proposition  3  characterizes  the  long-run  behavior  of  the 
stochastic  dynamics  with  mutations  (8).  Comparison  of  the  two  proposi- 
tions  shows how a small  change  in  the  dynamics-in  this  case the  introduc- 
tion  of arbitrarily  small  mutation  rates  L,  and  I,+an  have  a  significant 
impact  on  long-run  behavior.  The  contrast  between  the  two  propositions  is 
greatest  in  the  coordination  case. In  that  case the  long-run  behavior  of (3’) 
depends  on  the  initial  state,  whereas  the  long-run  behavior  of (8)  does  not. 
h4?‘57,‘?-12 434  FUDENBERG  AND  HARRIS 
One  way  of  understanding  why,  in  the  coordination  case,  there  is  an 
ergodic  distribution  for  any  positive  i,  and  A2 but  for  A1  =  2, =  0 is to  note 
that  for  a fixed  small  0,  the  expected  transit  time  from  one  basin  of attrac- 
tion  to  the  other  grows  without  bound  as 1,  and  &  go  to  zero.  Thus  the 
behavior  of the  system  until  a fixed  finite  time  T is continuous  at  the  limit 
2,)  L2 =  0;  it  is the  asymptotic  behavior  that  changes  discontinuously. 
The  reason  that  the  expected  transit  times  increase  at  the  L’s  shrink  is 
that  this  causes the  stable  steady  states  of the  deterministic  part  of  (8)  to 
approach  the  boundary,  and  the  process  is  likely  to  travel  to  the 
neighborhood  of the  “nearby”  steady  state  before  transiting  to  the  basin  of 
the  other  one.  Thus  for  small  2r  and  LZ the  process  is  likely  to  approach 
very  near  the  “nearer”  boundary  before  reaching  the  other  basin,  and  near 
the  boundary  the  replicator  dynamics  evolve  very  slowly.  This  raises  the 
question  posed  by  Ellison  [3]  in  his  critique  of the  work  of Kandori  et al.: 
For  plausible  parameter  values,  does  the  system  converge  to  its  ergodic  dis- 
tribution  fast  enough  for  that  distribution  to  be  relevant?  We  will  return 
to  this  question  after  Proposition  4 below,  which  determines  the  limit  of the 
ergodic  distribution  for  the  coordination  case as the  mutation  rates  and  the 
variance  of the  shocks  both  converge  to  zero. 
Propositions  1  and  3  show  that  obtaining  an  ergodic  distribution  in 
a  modified  version  of the  replicator  dynamics  requires  both  some  noise  at 
the  aggregate  level  and  a  force  that  keeps  the  system  away  from  the 
boundaries.  I2  Aggregate  shocks  to  payoffs  do  not  satisfy  the  second 
requirement,  as we have  seen. Aggregate  shocks  with  constant  variance  at 
the  level  of the  population  shares,  a case considered  by  Foster  and  Young, 
provide  a probability  of moving  in  from  the  boundaries,  but  they  also  imply 
a  positive  probability  of reaching  the  boundary  in  finite  time,  which  poses 
difficulties  we discuss  in  the  concluding  section. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  finite-population  model  of  Kandori, 
Mailath,  and  Rob,  stochastic  mutations  satisfy  both  requirements:  They 
add  aggregate  noise  to  the  system,  and  keep  it  from  being  absorbed  at  the 
boundaries.  This  highlights  an  important  difference  between  shocks  to 
payoffs  and  shocks  that  operate  directly  on  the  strategies  players  use: The 
former  will  have  little  impact  at  states  in  which  all  players  are  currently 
using  the  same  strategy,  while  the  latter  need  not  be  expected  to  vanish  at 
such  states. l3 
Returning  to  the  analysis  of  (S),  one  can  compare  the  asymptotic 
behavior  as r~r and  o2  go  to  zero  with  that  of system  (3’)  when  (T, and  g2 
‘*  Actually  it  suffices  that  the  system  be  kept  away  from  one  of  the  boundaries:  If  the  other 
one  is  absorbing,  the  ergodic  distribution  will  concentrate  there. 
I3  Kandori  et al.  specify  the  mutation  process  at  the  individual  level,  and  then  derive  the 
associated  aggregate  process,  so  that  they  do  not  encounter  the  boundary  problems  that 
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go  to  zero,  as summarized  in  the  remarks  following  Proposition  1 and  in 
Proposition  2.  Fortunately,  the  ergodic  distribution  of  system  (8)  always 
has  a  limit  as g1  and  c2  go  to  zero,  so  the  behavior  of system  (8)  in  this 
limit  is well  defined.  The  limiting  distribution  does,  however,  depend  on  i, 
and  A, in  general.  The  most  concise  way in  which  to  make  the  comparison 
is therefore  to  compare  the  iterated  limit  in  which  first  0,  and  (T* and  then 
1,  and  1,  go  to  zero  in  system  (8)  with  the  limit  in  which  C,  and  o2  go 
to  zero  in  system  (3’). 
The  iterated  limit  of  the  ergodic  distribution  of  system  (8)  is  easy  to 
calculate  in  the  cases  of  a  strictly  dominant  strategy  and  of  a  mixed- 
strategy  equilibrium:  In  the  former  case it  is  the  strictly  dominant  strategy, 
and  in  the  latter  it  is  the  mixed-strategy  equilibrium.  In  the  coordination 
case the  general  iterated  limit  defined  above  is not  well  defined.  If,  however, 
one  requires  that  A,  and  A2 go  to  zero  in  such a way that  the  ratio  between 
them  remains  fixed,  then  the  iterated  limit  does  exist,  and  corresponds  to 
the  risk-dominant  equilibrium. 
From  this  perspective,  then,  the  behavior  of the  system  (3’)  as cr, and  g2 
to  zero  is  very  close  to  that  of system  (8)  when  0,  and  CJ~  go  to  zero  in  the 
cases of a  strictly  dominant  strategy  and  of a  mixed-strategy  equilibrium. 
In  the  coordination  case, on  the  other  hand,  the  two  systems  behave  very 
differently.  Letting  gI  and  oz go  to  zero  in  system  (3’)  leads  to  the  selection 
of an  equilibrium  based  on  the  initial  condition,  whereas  letting  O,  and  (T? 
go  to  zero  in  system  (8)  (and  then  letting  A,  and  ;Lz go  to  zero,  holding 
their  ratio  fixed)  leads  to  the  selection  of  the  risk-dominant  equilibrium 
independently  of the  initial  condition.  So  we see once  again  how a  small 
change  in  the  dynamics  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  analysis. 
We  do  not  give  precise  statements  or  proofs  of these  results  concerning 
the  iterated  limit  of the  ergodic  distribution  of system  (8).  The  results  for 
the  cases  of  a  strictly  dominant  strategy  and  of  a  mixed-strategy  equi- 
librium  are  unsurprising;  the  results  for  the  coordination  case  are  a 
corollary  of Proposition  4  below. 
We  pursue  instead  a  slightly  different  line  of thought.  The  overall  effect 
of  adding  noise  and  mutations  to  the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics  is 
to  ensure  that  the  long-run  behavior  of the  system  can  be  described  by  an 
ergodic  distribution  independent  of the  initial  condition.  How  does  this  dis- 
tribution  behave  as the  perturbation  which  gave  rise  to  it  is  made  small? 
The  answer  is  contained  in  Proposition  4. 
PROPOSITION  4.  Suppose  that a > c and d > b (the coordination case). Fix 
p,,pz>O,  and  assume that  A1=pll  and  lz=p21,  where  A>O.  Let 
I7( .I (T,, 02, A,,  &)  denote the ergodic distribution  of  ~1,. Then 436 
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(i)  apoint  mass  on  n, =  1 ij-a-c>d-b;  and 
(ii)  a point  mass  on  :I, =0  ifa-c<d-b. 
That  is,  the  ergodic  distribution  collapses  to  a  point  mass  on  the  risk- 
dominant  equilibrium  when  we let  0, , g2,  I,,  and  A2 go  to  zero,  provided 
that  the  ratio  of  J.,  to  L2 is  held  fixed.  (Actually,  as  the  proof  will  make 
clear,  all  that  we really  require  is that  the  ratio  of i,  to  A, remains  bounded 
away  from  zero  and  infinity.) 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  Proposition  4  with  the  result  obtained  by 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  for  the  coordination  case in  their  discrete-time, 
finite-population  model.  They  found  that  the  ergodic  distribution  collapses 
to  the  risk-dominant  equilibrium  as the  probability  of individual  mutation 
goes  to  zero.  Proposition  4 shows that  the  ergodic  distribution  collapses  to 
the  risk-dominant  equilibrium  as  the  probability  of  individual  mutation 
and  the  size of aggregate  shocks  go  to  zero;  moreover,  this  is true  irrespec- 
tive  of the  order  in  which  limits  are  taken.  Proposition  4 therefore  supports 
their  conclusion  by  obtaining  a  closely  related  result  in  a  different  model. 
The  support  lent  by  Proposition  4  is,  however,  qualified:  The  result  of 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  is  robust  to  sign-preserving  changes  in  the 
underlying  deterministic  replicator  dynamics,  but  this  is  not  true  of 
Proposition  4. For  example,  it  is easy to  see that  if we replace  ui(s)  -  z+(s) 
by  f(u,(s)  -  u2b),  s)  in  (81,  where  f(  ., s)  is  a  strictly  increasing  function 
such  that  f(0,  S) =  0  for  all  s, then  the  equilibrium  selected  will  depend  on 
f  as well  as the  payoffs  a,  b,  c, and  d. 
Proof  We  treat  the  case in  which  a -  c >  d -  b. Recall  that 
with  ZE  (0,  1)  fixed.  Noting  that 
1  1 
p’o  =  a2x2( 1 -  x)’ 
=Lexp[2/‘[&-b]dy--2ln[z(I-z)]]. 
a2 
if follows  that  M(x)  is proportional  to 
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say,  where 
w=&J4+~2Cy2(l  -y)-y(l  -yJ21 
=y(l-y)  (a-c+ai)?,-(d-b+cJ?)(l  -.y)+$+ 
[  I  Y  ’ 
and F(Y)=  ~(1  -Y). 
Evaluating  the  integral  defining  h, and  choosing  z appropriately,  we may 
take  it  that 
/z(y)=  -(a-c+a:+E.,-i,)ln(l  -I’) 
-(d-b+a~+,!,-1W2)lny-12/y-1.,/(l-y). 
It  can  also  be  shown  that,  for  (T,,  a2,  E,, ,  and  J2  sufficiently  small, 
~Z(y)/fl*(y)  has  precisely  three  zeros:  0 <  Y, <  Y, <  Y, <  1. So  h  is  strictly 
increasing  on  [0,  Y,]  and  on  [ Y2,  Y,],  and  strictly  decreasing  on 
[Y,,  Y,]  and  on  [ Yj,  11.  Moreover  Y,,  Y,,  and  Y,  are  asymptotically 
equivalent  to  n&d-b),  (d-  h)/(d-  b +  a -  c),  and  1 -  2,/(a  -  c),  respec- 
tively,  when  CT,, a2,  1,  and  A, -+ 0.  So  h( Y,)  and  h( Y,)  are  asymptotically 
equivalent  to  (a-c)log(l/2,)  and  (d-h)log(1/1,)  when  a,,  a2,  2, 
and  E., +  0. And  these  expressions  in  turn  are  asymptotically  equivalent  to 
(a-c)  log(l/A)  and  (d-6)  log(l/l)  when  a,,  a*,  and  A+  0  (in  other 
words,  when  we take  account  of the  additional  assumption  that  the  ratio 
of A,  to  A,  is fixed).  Since  a -  c >  d -  6, we conclude  that  Y3 is  the  global 
maximum  of h.  (Note  that  this  maximum  becomes  more  pronounced  as 2 
gets  smaller.) 
Let  Xi  be  the  unique  point  in  ( Y,,  Y,)  such  that  h(X,)  =  h( Y,).  Let 
X2 =  1 -  1,  Y1/A2.  Since  Y,  is asymptotically  equivalent  to  A,/(d-  b), X,  is 
asymptotically  equivalent  to  1 -  I,/(d-  b).  Hence  we  may  take  it  that 
X2 E (Y,,  Y,).  Next,  from  the  formula  for  h we obtain 
as .s  =  max{af,  a:,  Ai,  %,} +  0.  Also, 
/2(X,)  =  (a-c)  In 
1  A,  (  > 
- 
l-X, 
-l-x  +  O(E log  E) 
2 
I 
A2  =(a-c)ln  -  (  > 
-$+O(ElogB) 
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as E +  0. Hence,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  ratio  2,/A,  is fixed,  h(X,)  >  h(X,) 
for  all  E  sufficiently  small,  and  we  may  take  it  that  XZ >  X,.  It  can  be 
shown,  further,  that  X,  is  asymptotically  equivalent  to  1 -exp((d-  b)/ 
(a -  c))  Y:d-bb)i(rrPL.).  In  particular,  X,  +  1 as E +  0. 
Now  the  ratio  of  the  probability  mass  that  the  ergodic  distribution 
assigns  to  the  interval  [X,,  Y3]  to  the  probability  mass  that  it  assigns  to 
the  interval  [0,  X,]  is  at  least 
But  X,  --+ 1 as E +  0,  and  Y, -X2  behaves  asymptotically  like 
(l-S)?  Y,. 
Hence  (9)  behaves  asymptotically  like 
(l-s)?exp[-ln($)+-$[((ac)-(d-h)) 
x In 
(  )  A 
+  +(a-c)ln  f 
1  ( )I1 
. 
I 
Since  2,/n,  is fixed,  we conclude  that  (9)  converges  to  infinity  as (r +  0;  so 
the  probability  mass  in  the  interval  [0,  X,]  tends  to  zero.  Since  X,  +  1, we 
are  finished.  [ 
As promised,  we will  now return  to  the  question  of the  relevance  of the 
ergodic  distribution  for  plausible  parameter  values.  Suppose  that  the  payoff 
matrix  is  given  by  a =  2, b =  c =  0,  and  d =  1, so that  strategy  1 is the  risk- 
dominant  equilibrium.  Supposing  that  the  system  starts  in  the  basin  of 
strategy  2,  say at  d1 =  i,  how long  will  it  take  to  reach  the  point  g1 =  f?  If 
we let  V(X) be  the  expected  waiting  time  to  reach  3 from  initial  condition 
x,  a  standard  argument  shows that  u satisfies  the  differential  equation 
/l’(x)  U”(X)/2  +  a(x)  u’(x)  =  -  1,  (10) 
where  a and  8,  respectively,  are the  deterministic  and  stochastic  parts  of the 
system  (8).  This  second-order  equation  requires  two  boundary  conditions. 
Clearly  u(s) =  0;  and  the  solution  should  also  satisfy  the  condition 
lim  x+0  u’(x)  =  -  l/L,.  (Remember  that  at  d1 =  0,  (8)  simplifies  to 
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It  can  be  verified  that  the  formula 
t1(.x,=l?‘~(j~2~~‘(.s)exp[  -  j~(2a(r)/iK’(r)m]L)~~  (11) 
.x  s 
satisfies  (10)  and  both  boundary  conditions. 
For  given  parameter  values,  (11)  can  be numerically  integrated  to  obtain 
the  expected  transition  time.  But  what  parameter  values  are  reasonable? 
Our  specification  of the  deterministic  replicator  dynamics  suggests that  one 
unit  of time  is of the  order  of the  average  lifetime  of the  individuals  in  the 
population.  l4 Thus  the  mutation  rates should  correspond  to  the  percentage 
of  mutations  per  generation.  Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [7]  cite  evidence 
that  the  frequency  of  mutations  at  the  level  of  individual  genes  is  of  the 
order  10P6.  Of  course,  even  for  animals,  the  rate  of mutations  at  the  level 
of the  organism  can  differ  from  that  for  the  individual  genes.  Also,  if  the 
replicator  dynamics  is interpreted  as a rough  metaphor  for  a non-biological 
process,  the  appropriate  mutation  rate  may  be  much  higher.  For  this 
reason  we computed  the  transition  times  for  ,?  =  10d4  and  A=  lo-’  as well. 
Finally,  we choose  the  value  0 =  1 for  the  variance  of  the  payoff  shocks. 
For  all  three  parameter  values,  the  expected  transition  times  from  $ to  f are 
of  the  order  10/L  Thus  the  transition  times  are  “reasonably  small”  if 
i  =  10P2,  and  perhaps  for  A=  10e4  as well. 
V.  RELATED  WORK 
The  paper  closest  to  ours  is Foster  and  Young  [4],  who  were, so far  as 
we know,  the  first  to  model  evolutionary  dynamics  with  a  stochastic  dif- 
ferential  equation.  I5 Our  work  differs  from  theirs  in  several  ways. First,  we 
begin  with  equations  for  population  sizes, and  then  derive  the  equations  for 
population  shares  using  Ito’s  lemma.  This  leads  us  to  a  different  specifica- 
tion  of the  deterministic  part  of  the  system  than  they  used.  It  also  results 
in  the  variance  term  shrinking  to  zero  at  the  boundaries.  The  processes 
Foster  and  Young  considered  did  not  have  this  property,  and  hence  their 
analog  of our  (3’)  can have  solutions  that  reach  the  boundary  in  finite  time. 
In  particular,  this  is  the  case  for  their  (3)  which  is  the  one  example  to 
which  they  apply  their  main  theorem. 
I4  If  a  strategy’s  payoff  corresponds  to  its  net  reproduction  rate,  and,  as  in  Boylan’s  [2] 
construction,  each  individual  reproduces  once  per  unit  of  time,  then  the  size  of  that  strategy’s 
population  should  double  in  one  time  period.  With  our  specification  (1)  the  strategy’s 
population  would  actually  increase  by  a  factor  of  e;  this  could  be  corrected  by  multiplying 
the  right-hand  side  of  (1)  by  the  constant  m(2). 
I5 We  thank  George  Mailath  for  making  us  aware  of  their  work. 440  EUDENBERG  AND  HARRIS 
Foster  and  Young  are  aware  that  the  state  can  reach  the  boundary  in 
finite  time.  They  respond  to  this  problem  by  specifying  the  dynamics  of 
their  process  only  on  the  subset  of the  state  space  in  which  all  population 
shares  are  at  least  A >  0,  and  by  arguing  that  immigration  and  muta- 
tion-appropriately  modelled-will  ensure  that  the  process  remains  within 
this  subset  almost  all  of  the  time.  They  argue  further  that  the  resulting 
process  (which  they  do  not  specify  precisely)  will  be  well  approximated  by 
a process  that  undergoes  reflection  at  the  boundary.  I6 This  response  raises 
a  number  of difficulties.  First,  the  conclusions  obtained  from  the  analysis 
are  likely  to  be sensitive  to  the  specification  of the  dynamics  for  population 
shares  less  than  d.  Second,  if  the  process  undergoes  reflection  at  the 
boundary,  or  is  well  approximated  by  such  a  process,  then  it  is  as though 
immigration  of individuals  of a given  phenotype,  or  mutations  resulting  in 
individuals  of a given  phenotype,  occur  only  when  the  population  share  of 
that  phenotype  is small.  One  might  argue  that  the  immigration  process will 
be  small  compared  to  other  effects in  the  interior  of  Sd,  and  hence  can 
safely  be  ignored,  but  this  conflicts  with  the  fact  that  the  rate  of mutation 
and  immigration  must  be  infinite  in  order  to  generate  instantaneous  reflec- 
tion  in  systems,  like  Foster  and  Young’s  examples,  where  the  variance  of 
the  process  is  constant.  ” 
Another  closely  related  paper  is  Young  and  Foster  [lo],  which  reports 
simulations  of  a  stochastic  discrete-time  evolutionary  system  with  a  finite 
population  on  a  3 x 3 two-player  game  with  two  pure-strategy  equilibria, 
one  of  which  is  a  strict  equilibrium,  and  the  other  is  weak.  Each  period, 
each  individual  plays  every  other  individual,  so  that  the  matching  process 
is  deterministic.  However,  the  payoff  to  each  player  given  the  strategies 
played  is  a  random  variable.  In  the  simulations,  as  the  population  size 
grows  and  stochastic  effects  become  correspondingly  small,  the  system 
spends  most  of its  time  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  strict  equilibria.  They 
suggest  that  this  limit  behavior  can  be  proved  by  first  applying  their  [4] 
results  to  a  continuous-time,  continuous-state-space  system,  and  then 
arguing  that  these  results  can  be  extended  to  large-population  limits  of the 
kind  they  are  considering.  (Note  that  this  will  require  a  different  limit 
argument  than  that  of  Boylan  [2],  who  considers  the  case  in  which  the 
I6 They  state  on  page  223  that:  “Mutation  and  immigration  keep  the  process  within  the 
space  Sd  almost  all  of  the  time,  and  the  boundary  acts,  to  a  good  approximation,  as  if  it  were 
reflecting.”  The  space  S,  corresponds  in  our  notation  to  { 3 1  oi >  A  >  0  for  all  i}.  They  have 
indicated  in  correspondence  with  us  that  they  mean  the  boundary  of  S,  to  be  reflecting  (as 
opposed  to  the  boundary  of  the  original  strategy  space),  and  that  they  have  in  mind  instan- 
taneous,  as  opposed  to  delayed,  reflection. 
”  A  third  diff’culty  with  Foster  and  Young’s  use  of  a  model  with  instantaneous  reflection 
is  that  such  models  are  not  covered  in  the  section  of  Freidhn  and  Wentzell  that  they  cite. 
Foster  and  Young  acknowledge  this  mistake  and  are  preparing  a  note  to  correct  it. EVOLUTIONARY  DYNAMICS  441 
fraction  of  the  population  that  is  matched  in  a  single  time  period  goes  to 
zero  as the  population  grows.) 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  [8]  consider  a discrete-time,  linite-popula- 
tion  system  playing  a  2 x 2  game.  As  in  Young  and  Foster,  each  period, 
each  individual  plays  every  other  individual  one  at  a time.  At  the  end  of the 
period,  the  current  population  shares  ill(t)  and  +(t)  of the  two  strategies 
are  updated  to  “intended”  shares  Z,(t  +  1)  and  &(t  +  1);  the  actual  shares 
at  (t +  1) can  differ  from  the  intended  ones  due  to  “mutations”  from  one 
strategy  to  the  other.  In  this  model,  when  the  mutation  rate  is low the  most 
probable  way  for  the  population  to  shift  from  one  strict  equilibrium  to 
another  is through  a sufficiently  large  number  of simultaneous  mutations,  as 
opposed  to  a succession  of single  mutations.  Thus  the  ergodic  distribution 
is determined  by  how many  mutations  are  required  to  jump  from  the  basin 
of attraction  of one  equilibrium  to  the  basin  of attraction  of the  other,  i.e., 
on  which  equilibrium  is risk-dominant.  Because  the  transitions  are  made  by 
“large”  jumps,  as opposed  to  a  succession  of small  ones,  the  exact  form  of 
the  process  that  maps  the  date-t  state  to  the  intended  state  at  date  (t +  1) 
is  not  important.  All  that  matters  is  the  size  of the  two  basins.  Since  the 
exact  form  of  the  deterministic  process  does  matter  in  models  with  con- 
tinuous  sample  paths,  their  work  combined  with  ours  raises  the  question  of 
which  type  of model  is more  appropriate  for  studying  the  evolution  of large 
but  finite  populations. 
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